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Abstract
We show articles published in “top-five” economics journals authored by men are cited less than
articles those same journals publish by women. Additionally, men’s citations rise when they co-author
with women whereas women’s citations fall while they co-author with men, conditional on acceptance.
Under strong—but we believe reasonable—assumptions, our findings imply top economics journals
hold female-authored papers to higher standards and, as a result, do not publish the highest quality
research. They also suggest that authors will be less willing to collaborate with women, all else equal.
Keywords: Gender, Discrimination, Quality, Citations, Research, Productivity, Collboration; JEL:
A11, J16, J24.
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1 Introduction
Discrimination hurts its victims and, sometimes, its perpetrators (Becker 1957). For example, if an
academic journal only publishes papers authored by men, its quality should decline relative to one that
is gender-blind; if a male economist refuses to co-author with women, his papers ought to publish less
well than the men who don’t.
For these reasons, discrimination is sometimes considered incompatible with competitive forces (see, e.g.,
Summers 2005). When markets are complete, the argument is roughly as follows: sufficient competition
between unprejudiced journals should ensure female-authored papers are accepted at rates just equal
to their marginal quality; sufficient competition between prejudiced and unprejudiced journals should
ensure each is ranked according to the quality of the articles it publishes.1 As long as a journal’s ranking
prices its articles’ quality, the quality of the papers it publishes should not vary by author gender nor
should returns to co-authoring depend on a co-author’s sex.2
As we show in this paper, however, articles published in top economics journals authored by men are
cited less than articles those same journals publish by women. Moreover, men’s citations rise when they
co-author with women whereas women’s citations fall while they co-author with men, conditional on
acceptance.
These results are based on an analysis of gender differences in citations in over 11,000 full-length articles
published in a “top-five” economics journal—i.e., American Economic Review (AER), Econometrica
(ECA), Journal of Political Economy (JPE), Quarterly Journal of Economics (QJE) and Review of
Economic Studies (REStud). We follow previous research and use the inverse hyperbolic sine (asinh) of
citations as our dependent variable (Card and DellaVigna 2020; Card et al. 2020). We stress, however,
that results and conclusions are similar if raw citations or alternative transformations are used instead
(see Appendices B and C).
Our first analysis suggests female-authored papers receive 22–24 log points more citations than male-
authored papers. Differences in citation patterns across field coupled with higher female concentration
in certain areas potentially explain, at most, half of the gap. Assuming quality positively associates
with citations and the latter are not biased in favour of women (conditional on the former), these
results suggest female-authored papers published in top economics journals are higher quality than
male-authored papers.
Higher quality female-authored papers could be consistent with gender-neutral acceptance standards if
women’s papers are accepted more often or the variance in their quality is greater (see Theorem 3.1).
Neither appears to be the case. Variance in quality is persistently lower in female-authored papers;
recent evidence from a set of journals that partially overlaps with our own suggests men’s and women’s
manuscripts are accepted at roughly equivalent rates (Card et al. 2020).
We also consider whether consistent same- or opposite-sex co-author complementarities meaningfully
contribute to gender differences in quality, conditional on acceptance. For example, men and women
may produce higher quality work when collaborating with one another; conversely, everybody could
work better with members of their own sex.
Our evidence does not support either hypothesis. After accounting for author-specific fixed effects,
we find men’s citations increase 10–12 log points when they co-author with an equal share of women
1When markets are incomplete, however, even taste-based discrimination can persist in competitive equilibria or generate
equilibria in which non-realised discrimination nevertheless results in an inefficient allocation of resources—e.g., because
some women flee to less discriminatory fields although their interests and talents would have been better matched to a
career in economics. See, e.g., Diamond (1971), Borjas and Bronars (1989) and Black (1995).
2If journal rankings perfectly price article quality, then every article published in the same journal must be exactly the
same quality. If markets are complete but journal rankings do not precisely price article quality, then there must exist
some other mechanism that does.
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(compared to papers those same men co-author entirely with other men). The returns to women of
co-authoring with an equal share of men, however, are -12 to -15 log points. These findings suggest
women disproportionately contribute to the quality of co-authored work, conditional on acceptance, and
are consistent with women facing tougher standards in peer review.
Moreover, the coefficients on co-author gender do not meaningfully change after accounting for field.
This points to a relationship between citations and gender that is independent of field, conditional on
author. Considered alongside the fall in coefficient value from our first analysis, it may also reveal an
underlying association between field and author-specific unobservables that will partially bias estimates
of gender differences in citations when controlling for the former but not the latter.
As a final exercise, we restrict our sample to senior male economists with at least two top-five papers
co-authored with a single junior author of each sex. In addition to accounting for potential unobserved
contributions from same-sex co-authors, these sample restrictions create a treatment group—senior male
authors co-authoring with exactly one junior woman—that very closely resembles the counterfactual
group—those very same seniors co-authoring with exactly one junior man.
Again, we find a senior man’s work is higher quality when it is co-authored with a woman. Citations
increase 60–70 log points—and 140 log points after accounting for field—when senior male economists
co-author with junior women as opposed to junior men.
Combined, our evidence suggests journals subject female authors to higher standards and, as a result,
their articles are better quality, conditional on acceptance. We emphasise, however, that these conclusions
rely on the following (strong) assumptions: (i) citations are not biased in women’s favour, conditional
on quality; (ii) author-specific heterogeneity is fixed over time (author-level analyses, only); (iii) quality
is normally (but not necessarily identically) distributed in male- and female-authored submissions; and
(iv) conditional on controls, male- and female-authored papers are accepted at similar rates.
Assuming (i)–(iv) are satisfied, non-top-five economics journals could have published higher quality
content than top-five economics journals simply by accepting more female-authored papers. The fact
that journal rankings have not adjusted to reflect this suggests the market for academic research remains
incomplete.
Journals function as price mechanisms—i.e., the journals in which articles are published serve as nominal
currency for their value. If women could hedge (without friction) against every possible publication
outcome in every possible state of the world, then biased acceptance decisions at one journal could
simply be “undone” by a costless change in one’s submission and publication strategy the previous
date—e.g., women could publish their higher quality papers in currently lower-tiered journals, confident
that their actions would lead to an appropriate relative change in journal rankings the very next period.
When competition isn’t perfect, however, discrimination interacts with one or more market frictions to
prevent those who discriminate from fully internalising its costs. Consequently, its victims will have to
partially bear them. For example, imperfect information about journal rankings may mean tenure and
promotion committees’ expectations are slow to adjust to the lower quality of journals that reject too
many women.3 As a result, women (and the men they co-author with) are tenured and promoted at
lower rates than they otherwise would be if markets were complete. To the extent that grant committees
similarly rely on applicants’ past publication histories to choose between projects, women will also have
a harder time funding future work.
Moreover, discrimination undoubtedly distorts authors’ decisions in ways that can further misallocate
available resources. Indeed, our own evidence implies male and female economists are better off col-
3See Heckman and Moktan (2019) for evidence that tenure expectations are indeed sticky. Moreover, AER, ECA, JPA,
QJE and REStud have remained at the top of the economics publishing hierarchy for the past 30–40 years (Ellison 2002).
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laborating with men, all else equal. This incentivises authors of both sexes to forgo higher quality
co-authoring opportunities with women in order to partner with men (see also Knobloch-Westerwick
et al. 2013).
This paper makes four contributions. First, we join a large literature investigating gender differences in
citations in economics (see, e.g., Ferber 1988; Laband 1987; Smart and Waldfogel 1996; Ginther and Kahn
2004; Hamermesh 2018; Grossbard et al. 2018; Card et al. 2020). We add to this research by studying the
comprehensive set of journals at the very top of the publishing hierarchy and examining gender-specific
contributions to quality in mixed-sex co-authoring relationships, conditional on acceptance.
Second, we also contribute to a substantial body of research suggesting women are, in many situations,
subjected to tougher standards and/or evaluated differently than men (see, e.g., Foschi 1996; Moss-
Racusin et al. 2012; Reuben et al. 2014; Krawczyk and Smyk 2016; Sarsons et al. 2019). Most relevant
to our work, Hengel (2019) finds female-authored papers in top-four economics journals are held to
higher writing standards in academic peer review. As a result, their manuscripts are subject to greater
scrutiny, spend longer under review and women, in turn, respond by conforming to those standards. Card
et al. (2020) finds female-authored papers are higher quality conditional on referee recommendations
using submissions data from a partially overlapping set of journals (Journal of the European Economic
Association, Review of Economics and Statistics, QJE and REStud).
Third, although market mechanisms undoubtedly alleviate discrimination’s downstream effect, our results
highlight that they will not, in general, fully absorb them. For example, the fall in women’s citations
when they co-author with men suggests adding male co-authors can mitigate higher acceptance standards;
men also experience a rise in citations when they co-author with women, however, so co-authorship alone
probably cannot eliminate them. And when combined with recent evidence of the “Matilda effect” in
tenure decisions—as Sarsons et al. (2019) shows, tenure committees discount women’s contributions to
mixed-sex co-authored work—co-authoring with men may bring other consequences, as well.
Finally, this paper builds on a broader literature studying editorial patterns (Card and DellaVigna 2013;
Casnici et al. 2017; Clain and Leppel 2018; Ellison 2002), bias in editorial decisions (Abrevaya and
Hamermesh 2012; Bransch and Kvansnicka 2017; Card and DellaVigna 2020; Hospido and Sanz 2019)
and female academics’ lagging productivity and under-representation (Auriol et al. 2019; Bayer and Rouse
2016; Chari and Goldsmith-Pinkham 2017; Ductor et al. 2018; Ginther and Kahn 2004; Heckman and
Moktan 2019; Lundberg and Stearns 2019; Teele and Thelen 2017). We also join a wider debate about
whether women are considered equal partners in research and given enough credit for their contributions
(see, e.g., Ferber 1986; Dion et al. 2018; Sarsons et al. 2019).
Our paper proceeds in the following order. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 assesses gender
differences in citations and quality. Section 4 investigates the returns to co-authoring with the opposite
sex. Section 5 concludes.
2 Data and empirical setting
Our data include 11,336 full-length, English-language articles published between 1950–2015 in the AER,
ECA, JPE, QJE and REStud. We define “full-length” as any article published with an abstract. Articles
from Papers & Proceedings issues of AER, errata and corrigenda are excluded.
Each of the 7,574 unique authors in our dataset was manually assigned a gender based on (i) obviously
gendered given names (e.g., “James” or “Brenda”); (ii) photographs on personal or faculty websites; (iii)
personal pronouns used in text written about the individual; and (iv) by contacting the author himself
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(B) Asinh of citation counts
Note. Left-hand graph displays the fraction of authors with a top-five paper that was cited 0–15 times, 16–50 times, 51–100
times, etc. Right-hand graph plots the histogram of transformed citations (asinh).
Figure 1: Distribution of citations
As we highlight in Section 2.2, exclusively female-authored papers are only a very small proportion of
articles published in top economics journals. We therefore define the gender of a paper by its fraction of
female authors. (See Hengel (2019) for a theoretical justification of this indicator.) For robustness, we
also replicate relevant analyses using a categorical variable to account for seven different gender categories
and by comparing entirely male-authored papers to papers with: (a) a senior female author; (b) at least
one female author; (c) a weak majority of female authors; and (d) a solo female author. Results are
shown in Appendix D.
Citation data were obtained from Web of Science (2018), a comprehensive database of all social science
research published since 1900. Counts correspond to the number of published papers in the Web of
Science database that cite a given article and include self-citations to later work. Citations for AER,
ECA, JPE and QJE were first collected in August 2017 and updated in January 2018; citations for
REStud were collected in October 2018.
2.1 Issues when analysing gender citation gaps
Analysing citation gaps raises several issues: (i) younger articles have had less time to accrue citations;
(ii) older articles are disproportionately male; (iii) mean citation counts may be distorted by a small
number of superstar economists; (iv) superstar economists are also disproportionately male. (i) and (iii)
skew the distribution of citations; (ii) and (iv) distort gender differences if they correlate with unobserved
factors that generate citations—e.g., winning a prestigious award—or produce self-reinforcing loops that
create citations all on their own (Merton 1986; Merton 1988; Zuckerman 1977).4
Additionally, men disproportionately cluster at the very top and bottom of the distribution of citations
but raw counts are censored below at zero and unbounded from above (Figure 1, Graph (A)). This
generates a non-linear mapping from quality onto citations that depends on the former’s variance. Thus
even in the absence of (i)–(iv), average citations to male-authored papers likely place too much weight
on high-citation papers and not enough weight on low-citation papers compared to the average for
female-authored papers.5
4In Appendix F, we illustrate how (iii) and (iv) combine to distort gender differences at the mean in raw citations by
constructing and controlling for a set of “superstar” and Nobel Prize fixed effects (Appendix F).
5For example, suppose the “quality” of female- and male-authored papers are each normally distributed with means zero
and variances one and two, respectively, and the exponential function maps quality onto citations. Then male-authored
papers are, on average, cited more than female-authored papers (2.7 versus 1.6, respectively) even though both groups’
average quality is exactly the same.
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We principally account for these issues by controlling for journal-year fixed effects and transforming raw
counts with the inverse hyperbolic sine function (asinh). This reduces the impact of outlier observations
and results in a far more symmetric distribution (Figure 1, Graph (B)). We emphasise, however, that
the conclusions we draw do not depend on the transformation. We find similar results using a quantile
regression model (Appendix B) and the log of 1 plus citations or raw counts themselves as the dependent
variable (see Appendix C).
A related concern is that the citations a paper accumulates aren’t fixed in time. As a result, they
could be influenced by the future success or failure of a paper’s authors—i.e., even among non-superstar
economists, a stronger publishing record later on probably drives citations to earlier work, all else equal
(for evidence see, e.g., Bjarnason and Sigfusdottir 2002). Female economists, however, have weaker
publishing histories: men’s mean number of top-five papers is 2.6; the corresponding figure for women is
only 1.8.
To account for this, we additionally control for how prominent an author is at about the time citations
were collected (max. T ). Max. T is equal to the total number of top-five articles for the most prolific
co-author as of the end of 2015. Because ex post success may itself be endogenous to citations, we also
show results without max. T .
Finally, several studies show citation counts correlate with sub-field and author prestige at the time of
publication, conditional on quality (see, e.g., Bornmann et al. 2012; Wang 2014). Additionally, more
co-authors can present a single paper more widely and self-cite it more frequently.6 We therefore account
for the following in most of our analyses: primary and tertiary JEL fixed effects,7 number of co-authors
(N) and author seniority at the time of publication (max. t)—i.e., the most prolific co-author’s total
number of top-five articles at the time the paper was published.
2.2 The representation of women in top-five economics journals
Women are under-represented in top-five economics journals. As Graph (A) in Figure 2 illustrates, the
situation has improved little with time: women make up only 11 percent of all authors published since
1990, 12 percent since 2000 and 14 percent since 2010. Between 1986–2015, there has been zero growth in
the number of exclusively female-authored papers; almost no growth in the number of majority female-
authored papers; and no meaningful change in the number of mixed-gendered papers with a senior female
co-author. The only tepid growth that has occurred, is largely—if not entirely—due to an increase in
the number of articles by senior men co-authoring with a weak minority of junior women.
Top-five journals publish about as many solo female-authored papers today as they did in the late 1980s
(Figure 2, graph (B)): seven in 1986, ten in 1997 and eleven in 2015. The number of solo male-authored
papers, however, has declined: 125 were published in 1986, 62 in 1997 and 45 in 2015. As a result, the
proportion of solo-authored papers by women has increased from five percent in 1986 to twenty percent
in 2015.
But falling male solo-authored papers has been more than offset by rising male co-authored papers. As
a result, the proportion of female authors on single-sex papers has remained stubbornly close to zero
for the past 30 years (Figure 2, graph (C)). In 1987, top-five journals collectively published 105 articles
co-authored by two men and zero articles co-authored by two women; in 2015, the corresponding figures
were 104 and one. Meanwhile, journals have sharply increased the number of single-sex articles they
publish by three or more men: 66 were published in 2015 versus 18 in 1986. As of 2015, however,
only six had ever been published by women; no top-five journal had yet to publish a full-length paper
6See Tahamtan et al. (2016, p. 1208) for a review of the research on the relationship between author count and citations.
7JEL codes were significantly revised in 1990; comparable codes are not available for periods pre- and post-reform. We



























































































































(H) No. mixed−gendered articles by senior author sex
Note. Graph (A) displays the stacked total number of female (pink) and male (blue) authors published in a top-five journal
each year. Graph (B) is the (non-unique) number of male and female economists with a solo-authored paper; Graphs (C)
and (D) plot the corresponding number of authors with a co-authored single-sex paper and a co-authored mixed-gendered
paper. Graphs (E) and (F) are the stacked total number and percentage, respectively, of exclusively female-authored,
mixed-gendered (green) and exclusively male-authored papers. Graphs (G) and (H) plot the total number of mixed-
gendered papers with a strict majority of male and female co-authors and a male and female senior author, respectively;
papers with an equal number of each gender or two or more senior authors of the opposite gender shown in green.
Figure 2: Gender composition of top-five publications
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exclusively authored by four or more women.8
Moreover, women do not make up a greater share of authors on mixed-gendered papers. Journals are
publishing more articles with at least one female author, but the number of male authors on these papers
has increased slightly faster than the number of female authors—meaning the share of women among
authors on mixed-gendered papers has actually declined. Graph (D) in Figure 2 plots the number of
authors with a co-authored mixed-sex top-five paper each year. In the late 1980s, men and women were
about equally represented. Since then, however, mixed-gendered papers have tended to generate more
publications for men than they do for women. Graphs (E) and (F) reinforce this conclusion. They
plot the number and percentage of single- and mixed-gendered papers published in top-five journals,
respectively: the latter has increased; the number and percentage of exclusively female-authored papers
is completely flat.
Finally, majority- and senior-female-authored papers are almost as rare today as they were 30 years ago.
Very few majority-female mixed-sex papers were published in top-five journals before 2000; since then,
they publish about four a year (Figure 2, Graph (G)). Meanwhile, the number of mixed-gendered papers
with a majority or equal share of male authors has risen. The result is little or no growth in majority-
female papers. Similarly, mixed-gendered papers with male senior authors have steadily increased since
the late 1980s (Graph (H)). But growth in papers with a senior female author or male and female
co-authors of equal rank is basically zero.
3 Gender differences in quality
3.1 Empirical strategy
Equation (1) represents the statistical relationship between gender and quality for papers published in
top economics journals:
q̂kjt = α0 + α1 femalek + ηjt + εkjt, (1)
where q̂kjt is a hypothetical indicator that perfectly captures the quality of paper k published in journal
j at time t, femalek represents the gender composition of paper k, ηjt absorb journal- and year/volume-
specific selection effects and εkjt is an error term.
Although it does not identify a particular causal mechanism, a non-zero α1 means papers published
by one gender are higher quality than papers published by the opposite gender.9 It may also imply
that quality is not the overriding objective determining what is and is not published in top economics
journals. To see this, assume papers are only accepted if their quality q ∼ Φg exceeds the gender-specific
threshold θg where Φg is a cumulative normal distribution function and g ∈ {M, F}. Let σ2g(θg) denote
group g’s variance in quality, conditional on acceptance and define α1 as in Equation (1). If male- and
female-authored papers are accepted at similar rates, conditional on submission (ΦM (θM ) = ΦF (θF )),
α1 > 0 but σ2F (θF ) ≤ σ2M (θM ), then female-authored papers have a lower probability of acceptance,
conditional on their quality—i.e., θM < θF (Theorem 3.1).
Theorem 3.1. Suppose Φg is a cumulative normal distribution function specific to group g ∈ {M, F} and
assume papers are only accepted if their quality q ∼ Φg exceeds the threshold θg. If ΦM (θM ) = ΦF (θF ),
α1 > 0 and σ2F (θF ) ≤ σ2M (θM ), then θM < θF .
Bringing Theorem 3.1 to the data poses two problems. First, the articles we evaluate have already
been published, so we cannot directly test for average gender differences in acceptances. Other studies,
however, suggest male- and female-authored papers are accepted at roughly similar rates. According to
8Since then, AER has published two and REStud one (current as of May 2019).
9E.g., if female economists co-author with higher quality research teams or have access to better data, α1 > 0.
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Blank (1991), 12.7 and 10.6 percent of male- and female-authored papers are accepted at AER. A recent
study of four journals that semi-overlap with our own suggests exclusively male- and female-authored
manuscripts receive a revise and resubmit decision 8 and 6 percent of the time, respectively (Card et al.
2020); the weighted average across all female-led papers is 7.4 percent (Card et al. 2018, Table 1, p. 39).
For a review of other relevant studies, see Ceci et al. (2014, p. 7) and Hengel (2019, pp. 28–29).
Our second problem is that we do not know q̂kjt. We use citations to proxy. Conditional on q̂kjt, citations
are assumed to depend on the additional factors represented in Equation (2):
citationskjt = β0 + β1 femalek + γ q̂kjt + θ Xk + λk + ukjt, (2)
where Xk is a vector of observable controls that affect citations conditional on quality (see Section 2).
λk captures unobservable confounders specific to citations. β1 picks up gender differences in citations
conditional on q̂kjt (and Xk). ukjt is the error term.
Let β̃0 = γ α0 + β0, α̃1 = γ α1 + β1, ε̃kjt = γ εkjt + ukjt and combine Equations (1) and (2) as follows:
citationskjt = β̃0 + α̃1 femalek + θ Xk + ηjt + λk + ε̃kjt. (3)
If the gender composition of article k does not partially correlate with unobserved factors picked up
by λk, OLS generates an unbiased estimate of α̃1.10 As long as citations are not biased in women’s
favour conditional on quality (β1 ≤ 0) and positively correlate with q̂kjt (γ > 0), OLS also conservatively
estimates α1 in Equation (1) conditional on Xk.
Prior research suggests both assumptions hold. Citations have been consistently found to positively
correlate with alternative measures of research quality (see, e.g., Stremersch et al. 2007; Buela-Casal and
Zych 2010). Economists believe female-authored papers are cited less, holding quality constant (Card
et al. 2020). Men are disproportionately more likely to cite their own (King et al. 2017) and other
male-authored work (Dion et al. 2018; Dworkin et al. 2020; Ferber 1986).
3.2 Results
Table 1 displays results from OLS estimation of Equation (3). Column (1) suggests female-authored
papers receive 16 log points more citations than male-authored papers conditional on author seniority at
the time of publication (max. t), number of co-authors (N) and journal-year fixed effects. Adjusting for
co-author prominence at the time citations were collected (max. T ) increases the coefficient on female
to 22 log points (column(2)).
Columns (3)–(5) estimate Equation (3) in the sub-sample of articles published after 1990 and controlling
for primary and tertiary JEL categories. Column (3) omits JEL fixed effects; the coefficient on female
is roughly equivalent to the estimate shown in column (2). It falls by 9–12 log points once field controls
are added (columns (4) and (5)). We also re-estimate Equation (3) without Xk on the sample of articles
published between 2000–2015.11 Results are shown in columns (6) and (7). The coefficient on female is
similar to the corresponding coefficients shown in columns (2) and (3).
10λk almost certainly captures unobservables associated with authors and articles located in the right tail of the distri-
bution (see Section 2.1 and Appendix F). Because they probably positively associate with citations and are located on a
segment of the distribution with few female authors, they bias our estimate of α̃1 downward. Thus, a positive OLS estimate
of α̃1 underrates the magnitude—but not the direction—of the coefficient’s true value. For robustness, we also control for
other observable factors that correlate with gender and might disproportionately impact right-tail citations, conditional on
quality. Results are shown in Appendix F.
11Older male-authored papers likely drive the bulk of right-tail bias (see Section 2.1) and are the primary reason we
control for Xk (and, especially, max. Tk). Their impact should, however, attenuate the closer an article is to its date
of publication—citations to younger articles are less skewed (Bornmann and Leydesdorff 2017); in our own data, gender
differences at the mean appear less influenced by superstar authors (see Appendix F).
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Table 1: Gender differences in the quality of research output
1950–2015 1990–2015 2000–2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
female 0.162*** 0.218*** 0.235*** 0.148*** 0.119** 0.194*** 0.252***
(0.051) (0.050) (0.051) (0.051) (0.055) (0.060) (0.061)
N 0.208*** 0.192*** 0.173*** 0.164*** 0.165***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017)
max. t 0.021*** −0.046*** −0.041*** −0.039*** −0.039***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
max. T 0.052*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.047***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)




σ2M (θM ) 1.723 1.640 1.134 1.081 0.883 1.028 1.110
σ2F (θF ) 0.935 0.910 0.867 0.832 0.422 0.855 0.982
Ratio p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.022
Obs. 11,335 11,335 6,475 6,475 6,475 4,165 4,165
R2 0.288 0.322 0.401 0.426 0.523 0.395 0.347
Note. Figures correspond to coefficients from OLS estimation of Equation (3). The dependent variable is citation counts
(asinh). Independent variables are the ratio of female authors (female), number of co-authors (N), author seniority at the
time of publication (max. t) and author prominence at the time citations were collected (max. T ). Columns (1)–(2) are
estimated on the entire sample. Columns (3)–(5) and (6)–(7) restrict the sample to articles published between 1990–2015
and 2000–2015, respectively. σ2M (θM ) and σ
2
F (θF ) are residual variances from estimating Equation (3) in the samples
of entirely male-authored papers and papers with at least one female author, respectively (see Footnote 12). They are
followed by p-values from testing the null hypothesis σ2M (θM )/σ
2
F (θF ) = 1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***,
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(B) Asinh of citation counts (residualised)
Note. Graphs display the histograms of raw (left) and asinh transformed (right) citations for solo-authored papers (4,548
male-authored papers and 326 female-authored papers). Citations have been residualised with respect to the following
controls: max. t, max. T and journal-year fixed effects.
Figure 3: Distribution of residualised citations, solo-authored papers
Figure 3 plots the distribution of citations—asinh (right) and raw counts (left)—for solo-authored papers,
controlling for max. t, max. T and journal-year fixed effects. Consistent with results in Table 1, mean
citations to women’s papers are higher than they are to men’s papers. Female-authored papers are
also relatively absent from the left- (and to a lesser extent right-) hand tail of both distributions. This
suggests the variance in women’s citations is lower than men’s.
σ2M (θM ) and σ2F (θF ) in Table 1 confirm this hypothesis. They represent residual variances from estimat-
ing Equation (3) in the sub-samples of entirely male-authored papers and papers with at least one female
author, respectively;12 they are followed by p-values from testing the null hypothesis σ2M (θM )/σ2F (θF ) =
1. In line with Figure 3, σ2F (θF ) is consistently lower than σ2M (θM ). Assuming quality is normally
distributed and male- and female-authored papers are accepted at roughly equivalent rates (conditional
on controls) then women’s higher mean citations but lower variance suggest they are subject to higher
standards in peer review (Theorem 3.1).
Figure 3 and our estimates of σ2M (θM ) and σ2F (θF ) may also signal that higher standards operate in ways
that affect more than just gender differences at the mean. In particular, women’s sparser representation
in the left-hand tail of the distribution (relative to the right-hand tail) could indicate that referees and
editors are less willing to gamble on their riskiest work.13
Coefficients on remaining co-variates coincide with findings from previous research. Papers with more
co-authors and by more prominent authors are cited more. The experience of an author at the time
of publication is positive and significant when max. T is not controlled for (column (1)) but negative
and significant when it is (columns (2)–(5))—i.e., authors’ publish their most cited work earlier in their
careers, conditional on reputation.
12We do not control for the ratio of female authors in the sample of papers with at least one female author, but results
are very similar if we do. See Appendix D for variance estimates comparing exclusively male-authored papers to papers:
by a senior female author, with at least 50 percent female authors or only female authors.
13In any case, the “greater male variability” hypothesis is unlikely to be consistent with Figure 3. Gender differences in
variability are equivalent to gender differences in (conditional) averages. Presumably, all academic economists publishing in
top journals are drawn from the top half of the distribution of “quality”. Thus, greater variability in men generally implies
that average male quality is higher than average female quality, conditional on being an academic economist published in
a top-five journal. (See also Ball et al. (2020) for similar arguments and evidence using citation data from fundamental
physics.)
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4 Returns to co-authoring with the opposite sex
4.1 Empirical specification
Equation (4) models the value added to author i from co-authoring his tth top-five paper with members
of the opposite sex:
citationsit = α̃−i1 sex−iit + θ Xit + λ̃i + ε̃it, (4)
where sex−iit is the proportional contribution opposite sex co-authors (−i ∈ {M, F}) made to i’s tth
paper, Xit is a vector of time-varying controls that impact citations and correlate with sex−iit , λ̃i are
author-specific effects and ε̃it is an error term.
As we show in Appendix A.2, if citations and quality positively correlate, the female composition of
a paper is weakly negatively associated with citations conditional on quality and λ̃i is independent of
time, then a non-zero α̃−i1 from a fixed effects regression of Equation (4) indicates sex−iit determines the
quality of i’s top-five papers. Considered in isolation, however, α̃−i1 ̸= 0 is vague about why. For example,
α̃F1 > 0 might mean men work harder when they co-author with women or women work harder when they
co-author with men (opposite-sex complementarities); α̃M1 < 0 could suggest women are more productive
when they collaborate with other women (same-sex complementaries). Both effects are also consistent
with male authors contributing less to the quality of a paper, conditional on acceptance (sex-specific
contributions).
α̃M1 and α̃F1 considered together provide more information. With opposite-sex complementaries, α̃M1 and
α̃F1 will be positive; with same-sex complementaries, both should be negative. A positive value for one
gender and negative value for the other suggests sex-specific contributions conditional on acceptance—
e.g., because papers by a particular gender are held to higher standards in peer review.
4.2 Results
To estimate Equation (4), we duplicate each article Nk times and assign observation kn article k’s
nth∈ {1, . . . , Nk} co-author. This generates a panel dataset following author i over the t ∈ {1, . . . , Ti}
papers he publishes in top-five journals.
Table 2 displays results from fixed effects regressions on the resulting sub-samples of male (first panel)
and female (second panel) authors, respectively. Assuming conditions outlined in Section 4.1 apply,
coefficients on sex−iit represent the average change in quality authors would experience if they switched
from co-authoring only with members of their own sex (sex−iit = 0) to co-authoring entirely with members
of the opposite sex (sex−iit = 1), conditional on acceptance. Given i’s own contribution to a paper implies
sex−iit < 1, however, we always interpret and discuss the coefficient at sex−iit = 0.5.14
According to Table 2, the quality of men’s papers rises when they co-author with the opposite sex whereas
the quality of women’s papers falls. Compared to the baseline of sexFit = 0, men’s papers improve 10–12
log points when co-authored with an equal share of women (Table 2, first panel, columns (1)–(2)). The
returns to women of co-authoring with an equal share of men, however, are -12 to -15 log points (second
panel, columns (1)–(2)).
Moreover, results for both genders do not meaningfully change when articles published before 1990 are
excluded or if JEL fixed effects are added (columns (3)–(6)).15 This latter result may also suggest that
the relationship between citations and gender does not depend on field after accounting for author fixed
effects. Combined with results in Table 1 (columns (3)–(5)), it could also reveal an underlying association
14For the range of citation counts above 2–3—about 98 percent of our data—the impact of co-authoring with x percent
sex−iit is approximately α̃1 × x (Bellemare and Wichman 2020).15The sample of female authors with two or more publications is too small to control for tertiary JEL categories.
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Table 2: Returns to co-authoring with the opposite sex
1950–2015 1990–2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Returns to men from co-authoring with women
sexF 0.200** 0.239*** 0.197** 0.227** 0.168* 0.211**
(0.088) (0.088) (0.090) (0.091) (0.091) (0.096)
N 0.165*** 0.148*** 0.161*** 0.151*** 0.145*** 0.160***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017)
max. t 0.004 −0.012*** 0.003 −0.019*** −0.018*** −0.019***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
max. T 0.021*** 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.026***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Returns to women from co-authoring with men
sexM −0.238 −0.296** −0.285* −0.334** −0.372**
(0.153) (0.146) (0.152) (0.149) (0.159)
N 0.223*** 0.224*** 0.208*** 0.211*** 0.209***
(0.051) (0.052) (0.050) (0.052) (0.052)
max. t 0.028*** −0.024 0.023*** −0.034* −0.042**
(0.009) (0.020) (0.009) (0.019) (0.018)
max. T 0.048*** 0.052*** 0.058***
(0.018) (0.017) (0.016)
Year×Journal 3 3 3 3 3 3
JEL (primary) 3
JEL (tertiary) 3
Note. Figures correspond to coefficients from fixed effects estimation of Equation (4). The dependent vari-
able is citations (asinh). Independent variables are the ratio of opposite-sex co-authors (sex−i), number
of co-authors (N), author seniority at the time of publication (max. t) and author prominence at the time
citations were collected (max. T ). Panel one is estimated on the sample of male authors only. Columns
(1)–(2) are estimated on all men (6,701 unique authors; 2,965 with two or more top-five publications);
columns (3)–(6) restrict the sample to articles published between 1990–2015 (4,447 unique authors; 2,276
with two or more top-five publications). Panel two is similarly estimated on the sample of female authors
only (873 unique authors and 287 authors with two or more top-five publications in columns (1)–(2); 751
unique authors and 270 authors with two or more top-five publications in columns (3)–(5)). Standard er-
rors clustered at the author-level in parentheses. ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%,
respectively.
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Table 3: Returns to senior men from co-authoring with junior women
1950–2015 1990–2015
(1) (2) (3) (4)
sexF 0.302 0.599* 0.668* 1.352***
(0.328) (0.322) (0.344) (0.267)
max. t = t −0.145*** −0.172*** −0.270**
(0.048) (0.049) (0.074)
Year×Journal 3 3 3 3
JEL (primary) 3
Obs. 242 242 179 179
Note. Figures correspond to coefficients from fixed effects estimation of Equation (4)
on the sub-sample of authors and papers that satisfy the following criteria: senior male
authors (tit = max. tit) with at least two top-five papers (max. tit > 1) co-authored
with exactly one (Nit = 2) economist of each sex (sexFit = 0.5 and sexFit′ = 0, t ̸= t
′)
who has no previous top-five publications (min. tit = 1). Sample includes 73 senior
men, 154 papers co-authored with exactly one junior man and 88 papers co-authored
with exactly one junior woman. Standard errors clustered at the author level in paren-
theses. ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
between field and author-specific unobservables that biases estimates of gender differences in citations
that only control for the former.
As argued in Section 4.1, α̃F1 > 0 and α̃M1 < 0 imply female-specific contributions drive gender differences
in quality, conditional on acceptance, and are consistent with Section 3’s conclusion that women are held
to higher standards in top-five peer review. Our estimates may, however, be biased by contributions
from unobserved co-authors—e.g., male economists may be more likely to collaborate with high-quality
men on projects with at least one female author.
To account for this, we additionally limit our sample to papers and authors that satisfy the following
criteria: senior male authors (tit = max. tit) with at least two top-five papers (max. tit > 1) co-authored
with exactly one (Nit = 2) junior (min. tit = 1) economist of each sex (sexFit = 0.5 and sexFit′ = 0,
t ̸= t′).16 The subsequent sub-sample yields one treatment group—senior male economists co-authoring
with exactly one junior woman—and one control group—those same men co-authoring with exactly one
junior man. Appendix E.2 lists the names of all 73 senior men.
Coefficients from fixed effects regressions are shown in Table 3. Column (1) does not control for max. tit =
tit: the coefficient on sexF is similar in magnitude to estimates in Table 2, but its standard error is
noticeably larger. As shown in Appendix E.1, tit is somewhat imbalanced between treatment and control
groups; after adjusting for it, α̃F1 doubles (column (2)) and becomes weakly significant. Excluding articles
published before 1990 does not noticeably impact α̃F1 (column (3)). Adding JEL fixed effects does: α̃F1
doubles again and is highly significant (column (4)).
5 Conclusion
Male-authored papers published in top economics journals are cited less than female-authored papers.
Moreover, citations to men’s papers rise with they co-author with women whereas citations to women’s
papers fall when they co-author with men, conditional on acceptance. Under strong, but reasonable
assumptions, we argue these findings suggest female authors face tougher standards in peer review.
Ideally, publication in a top journal would send a weaker signal about the quality of male-authored papers
than it would about the quality of female-authored papers. In the real world, however, expectations are
16The number of senior female economists satisfying these conditions is too small to similarly analyse senior women.
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slow to adjust (see, e.g., Heckman and Moktan 2019). As a result, higher standards in peer review create
higher standards for tenure and promotion. They also incentivise both genders to collaborate with men.
In economics, we tend to favour policies targeted at individual market imperfections. But when the space
of information asymmetries and transaction costs is large and poorly understood, active policy solutions—
including formal and informal quotas—may be sensible alternatives (Lundberg 1991; Lundberg and
Startz 1983). They are not only objective and non-punitive but may also create positive externalities
that could not have been achieved using markets alone (see, e.g., Niederle et al. 2013; Besley et al. 2017).
For example, clearly signalling a determination to publish more female authors will likely decrease the
relative price of co-authoring with women and encourage more fruitful collaborations.
But active policy interventions are only Pareto improving when based on an adequate understanding of
the context. More research is certainly needed. We hope journals are challenged to address the tougher
standards they likely impose on women, willing to support the access and research needed to better
understand them and open to whatever policy options most effectively check them.
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A Proofs and derivations
A.1 Proofs
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Conditional on acceptance, the mean quality of papers by group g ∈ {M, F} is










dq + θg, (A.1)
where the last equality is obtained using integration by parts (see for example Hajeck (2015), p. 19; the
Remark following this proof provides a full derivation). Thus, α1 > 0 is equivalent to∫ ∞
θM
1 − ΦM (q)




1 − ΦF (q)




ΦF (q) − ΦF (θF )
1 − ΦF (θF )
dq. (A.2)
By way of a contradiction, assume θF ≤ θM . Thus, ΦF (θF ) ≤ ΦF (q) for all q ∈ (θF , θM ), so Equation
(A.2) together with ΦM (θM ) = ΦF (θF ) implies∫ ∞
θM
(1 − ΦM (q)) dq <
∫ ∞
θM






Φg(q) dq = ∞. (A.4)
Since ΦF and ΦM are continuous distributions, however, there exists a sufficiently large q̄ such that
Equation (A.3) implies ∫ q̄
θM
ΦF (q) dq <
∫ q̄
θM
ΦM (q) dq. (A.5)
Suppose σ2M = σ2F . If µF ≤ µM , then ΦM (q) ≤ ΦF (q) for all q ∈ R, contradicting the inequality in
Equation (A.5). But if µM < µF , ΦF (q) < ΦM (q) for all q ∈ R; combined with θF ≤ θM , this implies
ΦF (θF ) ≤ ΦF (θM ) < ΦM (θM ),
contradicting our assumption that ΦF (θF ) = ΦM (θM ). Thus, σ2M ̸= σ2F .
Normal distributions are ordered in dispersion according to their variances (Lewis and Thompson 1981,
Section 6.3). That is, the distribution with the greater variance dominates the other in the dispersive
order (denoted by <disp). Φg <disp Φg′ and σ2g ̸= σ2g′ imply Φg intersects Φg′ exactly once and from
below (Shaked 1982, Theorem 2.1). Thus, Φg′(q) ≤ Φg(q) for all q ≥ q⋆ where q⋆ < ∞ uniquely satisfies
Φg(q⋆) = Φg′(q⋆).
If q⋆ ≤ θM , then Equation (A.5) implies that ΦM lies above ΦF for all q ≥ q⋆. To see that the same is
true when θM < q⋆, rewrite Equation (A.5) as∫ q̄
q⋆
ΦF (q) dq +
∫ q⋆
θM
ΦF (q) dq <
∫ q̄
q⋆
ΦM (q) dq +
∫ q⋆
θM
ΦM (q) dq. (A.6)
As q̄ → ∞, the limits of the first terms on each side of the inequality in Equation (A.6) are infinite
(Equation (A.4)) whereas the second terms are not. Thus, for a sufficiently large q̄′, Equation (A.6)
implies ∫ q̄′
q⋆





We therefore conclude that ΦM lies above ΦF for all q ≥ q⋆. Thus, ΦM <disp ΦF and so σ2M < σ2F and
also σ2M (θM ) < σ2F (θF ) (without proof). This establishes the desired contradiction.
Remark (Derivation of Equation A.1). Recall from the first part of Equation (A.1) that










q d(1 − Φg(q)). (A.7)
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q(1 − Φg(q)). (A.8)
It remains to show that the limit in Equation (A.8) is zero. Note that
lim
q→∞











































A.2 Section 4.1, full empirical strategy
Equation (A.10) models the value added to author i from co-authoring his tth top-five paper with
members of the opposite sex:
q̂it = α−i1 sex−iit + θq̂ X
q̂
it + αi + εit, (A.10)
where sex−iit is the proportional contribution of opposite sex co-authors (−i ∈ {M, F}) to i’s tth paper.
As before, q̂it is a hypothetical indicator that perfectly captures paper it’s quality. Xq̂it is a vector of
time-varying controls that impact quality and correlate with sex−iit . αi are author-specific effects. εit is
an error term.
Unfortunately, q̂it is not known. Again, we use citations to proxy. As in Section 3, we assume q̂it
positively relates to citations as well as the additional factors shown in Equation (A.11):
citationsit = β−i1 sex−iit + γ q̂it + θc Xcit + λi + uit, (A.11)
where Xcit is a vector of observable controls that affect citations conditional on q̂it—e.g., the field in
which a paper was published—and β−i1 measures the impact sex−iit has on citations conditional on q̂it
and Xcit. λi captures residual factors specific to citations and author i. uit is the error term.
Combine Equation (A.10) with Equation (A.11) and let α̃−i1 = γ α−i1 +β−i1 , λ̃i = γ αi +λi, ε̃it = γ εit +uit
and θ Xit represent θq̂ Xq̂it + θc Xcit:
citationsit = α̃−i1 sex−iit + θ Xit + λ̃i + ε̃it. (A.12)
If citations and quality positively correlate (γ > 0), the female composition of a paper is weakly negatively
associated with citations conditional on quality (βF1 ≤ 0 and βM1 ≥ 0) and λ̃i is independent of time,
conditional on Xit, then α̃−i1 from a fixed effects regression of Equation (A.12) conservatively estimates
α−i1 in Equation (A.10).1
1See Section 3.1 for evidence justifying βF1 ≤ 0 and βM1 ≥ 0. Note also that our assumption of time-independence is
stronger than required; a fixed effects estimate of α̃−i1 is consistent or conservative as long as the time-varying component
of λ̃i doesn’t partially correlate with sex−iit .
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B Quantile regression
Table B.1 re-estimates Table 1 using a quantile regression model and raw citation counts as the dependent
variable. The first panel replicates Table 1, column (2) at the 25th, median and 75th percentiles of review
times; the second panel similarly replicates column (4). The coefficient on female ratio is positive across
all three percentiles.
Table B.1: Table 1, quantile regression
1950–2015 1990–2015
25 pc. 50 pc. 75 pc. 25 pc. 50 pc. 75 pc.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
female 4.618*** 6.583*** 5.714* 4.396** 6.271** 1.569
(1.591) (2.107) (3.180) (1.992) (2.528) (3.716)
N 3.109*** 4.812*** 7.000*** 3.276*** 4.301*** 5.916***
(0.468) (0.660) (1.159) (0.618) (0.796) (1.193)
max. t −1.551*** −2.902*** −6.173*** −2.887*** −4.273*** −7.272***
(0.164) (0.211) (0.680) (0.238) (0.408) (0.922)
max. T 1.583*** 3.159*** 6.745*** 2.850*** 4.556*** 7.666***
(0.132) (0.171) (0.594) (0.205) (0.375) (0.861)
Year×Journal 3 3 3 3 3 3
JEL (primary) 3 3 3
Note. First panel replicates results shown in Table 1, column (2) across different percentiles of the distri-
bution using quantile regressions and raw citation counts as the dependent variable; second panel similarly
replicates results from column (4). Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * statistically sig-
nificant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
5
C Alternative dependent variables
The following sections replicate results presented in Tables 1, 2 and 3 using the log of 1 plus citations
(Section C.1) and raw citation counts (Section C.2) as dependent variables.
C.1 Log citations
Table C.1: Table 1, log of 1 + citations as the dependent variable
1950–2015 1990–2015 2000–2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
female 0.150*** 0.204*** 0.221*** 0.139*** 0.114** 0.180*** 0.236***
(0.048) (0.047) (0.049) (0.048) (0.052) (0.057) (0.058)
N 0.197*** 0.182*** 0.166*** 0.158*** 0.159***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
max. t 0.020*** −0.044*** −0.040*** −0.038*** −0.038***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
max. T 0.049*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.046***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)




σ2M (θM ) 1.530 1.454 1.033 0.985 0.804 0.914 0.989
σ2F (θF ) 0.842 0.818 0.783 0.751 0.379 0.761 0.876
Ratio p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.023
Obs. 11,335 11,335 6,475 6,475 6,475 4,165 4,165
R2 0.289 0.323 0.401 0.426 0.523 0.395 0.346
Note. Columns display estimates identical to those in Table 1, except that the dependent variable is the natural loga-
rithm of 1 plus an article’s raw citation count. ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table C.2: Table 2, log of 1 + citations as the dependent variable
1950–2015 1990–2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Returns to men from co-authoring with women
sexF 0.189** 0.228*** 0.187** 0.217** 0.161* 0.204**
(0.084) (0.084) (0.087) (0.087) (0.087) (0.092)
N 0.158*** 0.141*** 0.155*** 0.145*** 0.139*** 0.153***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
max. t 0.004 −0.012*** 0.003 −0.019*** −0.019*** −0.020***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
max. T 0.020*** 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.026***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Returns to women from co-authoring with men
sexM −0.222 −0.279** −0.273* −0.321** −0.358**
(0.147) (0.141) (0.147) (0.144) (0.152)
N 0.217*** 0.218*** 0.202*** 0.206*** 0.203***
(0.049) (0.050) (0.048) (0.050) (0.050)
max. t 0.026*** −0.025 0.022*** −0.034* −0.042**
(0.008) (0.019) (0.008) (0.018) (0.017)
max. T 0.047*** 0.051*** 0.058***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.015)
Year×Journal 3 3 3 3 3 3
JEL (primary) 3
JEL (tertiary) 3
Note. Columns display estimates identical to those in Table 2, except that the dependent variable is the
natural logarithm of 1 plus an article’s raw citation count. ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%,
5% and 10%, respectively.
Table C.3: Table 3, log of 1 + citations as the dependent variable
1950–2015 1990–2015
(1) (2) (3) (4)
sexF 0.270 0.565* 0.637* 1.329***
(0.316) (0.308) (0.340) (0.258)
max. t = t −0.144*** −0.173*** −0.272**
(0.047) (0.049) (0.071)
Year×Journal 3 3 3 3
JEL (primary) 3
Obs. 242 242 179 179
Note. Columns display estimates identical to those in Table 3, except that the de-
pendent variable is the natural logarithm of 1 plus an article’s raw citation count.
***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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C.2 Raw citations
The following tables replicate Tables 1, 2 and 3 using raw citation counts as the dependent variable.
Tables C.5 and C.6 are otherwise identical to their corresponding tables in Section 4. Because non-
transformed citations are sensitive to a very small number of “superstar” authors, estimates shown in
Table C.4 always control for N , max. t and max. T . Results that do not control for these variables are
shown in Appendix F.
Table C.4: Table 1, raw citations as the dependent variable
1950–2015 1990–2015 2000–2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
female 0.003 9.090 1.564 3.782 16.855** 11.319 9.920
(6.731) (7.581) (7.732) (8.894) (6.925) (7.118) (7.344)
N 21.996*** 18.939*** 18.068*** 19.206*** 10.337*** 10.157*** 11.074***
(4.302) (3.539) (3.485) (3.854) (2.008) (1.986) (2.357)
max. t −6.576*** −6.797*** −6.562*** −7.017*** −5.624*** −5.665*** −4.322***
(0.993) (1.131) (1.126) (1.071) (2.176) (2.063) (1.051)
max. T 6.502*** 6.851*** 6.697*** 6.928*** 5.510*** 5.585*** 4.326***
(0.803) (0.971) (0.966) (0.869) (1.938) (1.830) (0.913)
Year×Journal 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
JEL (primary) 3 3
JEL (tertiary) 3 3
Obs. 11,335 6,475 6,475 6,475 4,165 4,165 4,165
R2 0.072 0.139 0.150 0.252 0.211 0.227 0.405
Note. Columns display estimates similar to those in Table 1, except that the dependent variable is an article’s raw ci-
tation count. (See Appendix F for results that do not control for N , max. t and max. T .) ***, ** and * statistically
significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table C.5: Table 2, raw citations as the dependent variable
1950–2015 1990–2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Returns to men from co-authoring with women
sexF 21.462 28.503* 14.609 21.384 16.746 39.343*
(16.675) (16.664) (18.418) (18.129) (17.964) (23.678)
N 17.077*** 13.884*** 21.891*** 19.504*** 18.881*** 19.605***
(4.335) (4.209) (4.332) (4.054) (4.040) (4.030)
max. t 0.011 −2.897** −0.724 −5.713*** −5.535*** −4.349***
(0.715) (1.282) (0.676) (1.555) (1.549) (1.249)
max. T 3.733*** 5.525*** 5.410*** 4.702***
(0.979) (1.373) (1.374) (1.064)
Returns to women from co-authoring with men
sexM −8.889 −20.910 −21.175 −31.441 −30.281
(33.957) (33.946) (35.218) (35.320) (34.586)
N 23.883*** 24.224*** 21.583*** 22.300*** 19.389**
(8.307) (8.420) (8.263) (8.423) (8.963)
max. t 2.106 −8.589* 1.757 −10.108** −11.823***
(1.431) (4.373) (1.413) (4.589) (4.366)
max. T 9.922** 10.925*** 12.340***
(4.048) (4.135) (3.749)
Year×Journal 3 3 3 3 3 3
JEL (primary) 3
JEL (tertiary) 3
Note. Columns display estimates identical to those in Table 2, except that the dependent variable is an
article’s raw citation count. ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Table C.6: Table 3, raw citations as the dependent variable
1950–2015 1990–2015
(1) (2) (3) (4)
sexF −17.516 50.345 74.417* 211.099***
(47.429) (39.971) (42.038) (22.120)
max. t = t −33.214*** −32.036*** −56.197***
(8.782) (7.444) (3.663)
Year×Journal 3 3 3 3
JEL (primary) 3
Obs. 242 242 179 179
Note. Columns display estimates identical to those in Table 3, except that the depen-
dent variable is an article’s raw citation count. ***, ** and * statistically significant
at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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D Alternative proxies for article gender
The following tables replicate Table 1 using alternative definitions of female authorship. The first four
tables compare entirely male-authored papers to papers with a senior female author (Table D.1), a weak
majority of female authors (Table D.2), at least one female author (Table D.3) and a solo female author
(Table D.4). Mixed-gendered papers not satisfying the relevant “female” criteria in Tables D.1, D.2 and
D.3 and all co-authored papers in Table D.4 are dropped.
The final table uses a categorical variable to account for seven different gender categories: (i) female
solo-authored, (ii) female co-authored, (iii) mixed sex co-authored with a senior female author, (iv) mixed
sex co-authored with senior male and female authors of equal rank, (v) mixed sex co-authored with a
senior male author, (iv) male solo-authored and (vii) male co-authored.
Table D.1: Table 1, senior female author
1950–2015 1990–2015 2000–2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
female 0.099** 0.125*** 0.139*** 0.083** 0.066 0.080* 0.130***
(0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.045) (0.047) (0.048)
N 0.208*** 0.192*** 0.173*** 0.164*** 0.165***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017)
max. t 0.021*** −0.045*** −0.040*** −0.039*** −0.039***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
max. T 0.052*** 0.047*** 0.046*** 0.047***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)




σ2M (θM ) 1.686 1.607 1.126 1.076 0.887 1.027 1.108
σ2F (θF ) 0.763 0.736 0.699 0.659 0.196 0.703 0.922
Ratio p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.011
Obs. 11,335 11,335 6,475 6,475 6,475 4,165 4,165
R2 0.288 0.321 0.400 0.426 0.523 0.394 0.345
Note. Columns display estimates identical to those in Table 1, except that the independent variable female is equal to
a dummy variable equal to 1 if a female author had at least as many top-five papers as her co-authors at the time the
paper was published (758 papers). (Mixed-gendered papers with a senior male co-author are excluded.) ***, ** and *
statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table D.2: Table 1, majority female-authored
1950–2015 1990–2015 2000–2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
female 0.120*** 0.158*** 0.165*** 0.110*** 0.098** 0.131*** 0.169***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.041) (0.043) (0.044)
N 0.207*** 0.189*** 0.168*** 0.164*** 0.165***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.019)
max. t 0.020*** −0.046*** −0.041*** −0.039*** −0.039***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
max. T 0.051*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.047***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)




σ2M (θM ) 1.723 1.640 1.134 1.081 0.883 1.028 1.110
σ2F (θF ) 0.891 0.874 0.826 0.791 0.301 0.810 0.962
Ratio p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.025
Obs. 10,930 10,930 6,094 6,094 6,094 3,842 3,842
R2 0.282 0.316 0.395 0.421 0.521 0.393 0.345
Note. Columns display estimates identical to those in Table 1, except that the independent variable female is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if a weak majority (50% or more) of authors are female (1,046 papers). (Papers with a minority—but
positive—number of female authors are excluded.) ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table D.3: Table 1, at least one female author
1950–2015 1990–2015 2000–2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
female 0.101*** 0.141*** 0.149*** 0.092*** 0.080** 0.182*** 0.221***
(0.033) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.035) (0.037) (0.038)
N 0.201*** 0.182*** 0.160*** 0.157*** 0.159***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017)
max. t 0.020*** −0.046*** −0.041*** −0.039*** −0.039***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
max. T 0.052*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.047***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)




σ2M (θM ) 1.723 1.640 1.134 1.081 0.883 1.028 1.110
σ2F (θF ) 0.935 0.910 0.867 0.832 0.422 0.855 0.982
Ratio p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.022
Obs. 11,335 11,335 6,475 6,475 6,475 4,165 4,165
R2 0.288 0.322 0.401 0.426 0.523 0.397 0.349
Note. Columns display estimates identical to those in Table 1, except that the independent variable female is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if at least one author on a paper is female (1,451 papers). ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%,
5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table D.4: Table 1, solo-authored papers
1950–2015 1990–2015 2000–2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
female 0.135* 0.196*** 0.189** 0.095 0.087 0.195** 0.162*
(0.071) (0.071) (0.075) (0.073) (0.085) (0.093) (0.090)
max. t 0.029*** −0.050*** −0.050*** −0.045*** −0.045***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011)
max. T 0.060*** 0.056*** 0.053*** 0.052***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)




σ2M (θM ) 1.990 1.890 1.155 1.096 0.727 0.974 1.098
σ2F (θF ) 0.644 0.635 0.613 0.491 — 0.613 0.943
Ratio p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 — 0.001 0.245
Obs. 4,874 4,874 1,916 1,916 1,916 1,031 1,031
R2 0.224 0.262 0.350 0.383 0.588 0.382 0.316
Note. Columns display estimates identical to those in Table 1, except that the independent variable female is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if the paper was solo-authored by a woman (326 papers) and zero if it was solo-authored by a man
(4,548 papers). (All co-authored papers are excluded.) Due to small sample sizes, we omit σ2F (θF ) from column (5). ***,
** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table D.5: Table 1, multiple gender categories
1950–2015 1990–2015 2000–2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Female solo −0.019 0.081 0.166** 0.096 0.044 −0.096 −0.099(0.074) (0.073) (0.077) (0.076) (0.081) (0.086) (0.086)
Female
co-authored
0.271** 0.308*** 0.397*** 0.288** 0.318** 0.297*** 0.447***
(0.119) (0.118) (0.115) (0.117) (0.124) (0.107) (0.114)
Mixed sex,
senior female
0.132 0.160** 0.181** 0.119 0.192** 0.184** 0.261***
(0.082) (0.081) (0.082) (0.082) (0.093) (0.090) (0.092)
Mixed sex,
equal rank
0.029 0.046 0.095 0.054 0.006 0.044 0.077
(0.075) (0.073) (0.071) (0.071) (0.074) (0.073) (0.077)
Mixed sex,
senior male
0.101** 0.148*** 0.144*** 0.094** 0.088* 0.195*** 0.210***
(0.046) (0.045) (0.047) (0.046) (0.049) (0.051) (0.052)
Male solo −0.151*** −0.088** 0.034 0.029 0.028 −0.221*** −0.254***(0.042) (0.041) (0.046) (0.045) (0.048) (0.041) (0.042)
N
0.130*** 0.142*** 0.173*** 0.167*** 0.166***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.024)
max. t 0.020*** −0.046*** −0.041*** −0.039*** −0.039***(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
max. T 0.052*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.047***(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)




σ2M (θM ) 1.723 1.640 1.134 1.081 0.883 1.028 1.110
σ2F (θF ) 0.638 0.633 0.608 0.513 — 0.614 0.909
Ratio p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 — 0.000 0.075
Obs. 11,335 11,335 6,475 6,475 6,475 4,165 4,165
R2 0.289 0.322 0.402 0.427 0.524 0.403 0.358
Note. Columns display estimates identical to those in Table 1, except that the independent variable female is replaced by
a categorical variable that classifies papers as female solo-authored (326), female co-authored (50), mixed-sex co-authored
with a senior female author (148), mixed-sex co-authored by men and women of equal rank (234), mixed-sex co-authored
with a senior male author (693), male solo-authored (4,548) and the reference category, male co-authored (5,337 papers).
Residual variances are estimated on the samples of exclusively male- and female-authored papers, respectively. Due to
small sample sizes, we omit σ2F (θF ) from column (5). ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respec-
tively.
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E Section 4, supplemental output
E.1 Table 3, covariate balance
By design, the sample of senior authors used to estimate Table 3 fixes N and max. T , conditional
on author. For each author, however, t varies over time and appears somewhat imbalanced between
treatment and control groups, particularly after accounting for author-specific fixed effects and journal-
year interaction dummies (Figure E.1)—i.e., conditional on author, year and journal, the senior men in
our sample were slightly more experienced when they co-authored with junior women than they were
when they co-authored with junior men. For that reason, we additionally control for max. t in columns








































Note. Graph (A) plots max. t = t (x-axis) against asinh-transformed citations (y-axis) by co-author sex for the sample of
senior male authors satisfying the conditions outlined in Section 4.2 and Table 3. Graph (B) plots the residuals of both
variables after accounting for author-specific fixed effects and journal-year interaction dummies.
Figure E.1: Max. t balance among senior men
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E.2 Table 3, list of senior men
Table E.1: Table 3, list of senior men
Acemoglu, Daron Gastwirth, Joseph L. Moulin, Hervé
Alesina, Alberto Gertler, Mark Muller, Ulrich K.
Andreoni, James Hall, Robert E. Palfrey, Thomas R.
Andrews, Donald W. K. Hamilton, James D. Pesendorfer, Martin
Ashenfelter, Orley Helpman, Elhanan Phillips, Peter C. B.
Barro, Robert J. Hong, Yongmiao Plott, Charles R.
Barsky, Robert B. Hopenhayn, Hugo A. Polemarchakis, Herakles
Bernheim, B. Douglas Horowitz, Joel L. Pollak, Robert A.
Boldrin, Michele Jacoby, Hanan G. Ray, Debraj
Borjas, George J. Jovanovic, Boyan Restuccia, Diego
Bronars, Stephen G. Karni, Edi Robin, Jean-Marc
Browning, Martin J. Knight, Brian Rodríguez-Clare, Andrés
Burdett, Kenneth Kotlikoff, Laurence J. Roth, Alvin E.
Card, David E. Kremer, Michael Rubinstein, Ariel
Chiappori, Pierre-André Krishna, Pravin Smith, Lones
Cochrane, John H. Krueger, Alan B. Smith, V. Kerry
Cogley, Timothy Kuhn, Peter Stockman, Alan C.
Crawford, Vincent P. Libecap, Gary D. Tollison, Robert D.
Deneckere, Raymond J. Matthews, Steven A. Waldfogel, Joel
Dow, Gregory K. Mertens, Jean-François Weibull, Jörgen W.
Duffy, John Milgrom, Paul R. Weinstein, David E.
Ehrenberg, Ronald G. Miller, Robert A. White, Halbert
Feldstein, Martin S. Moen, Espen R. Wright, Randall
Flinn, Christopher J. Mookherjee, Dilip
Frankel, Jeffrey A. Morgan, John
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F Right-tail confounders
In order to illustrate how gender differences in raw citation counts at the mean may be distorted by a
small number of extremely famous—and disproportionately male—economists, we control for “superstar”
(Appendix F.1) and Nobel Prize winning authors (Appendix F.2).
F.1 Superstar authors
We define “superstars” as authors who satisfy one or more of the following criteria:
1. 17 or more top-five publications (1 percent of all authors);
2. 10 or more top-five publications, one of which is cited at least 2,500 times (0.2 percent of all
authors);
3. 5 or more top-five publications, one of which is cited at least 5,000 times (0.1 percent of all authors).
The first criteria defines superstar according to quantity, alone. It is set as one plus the lifetime number of
publications of the most prolific female economist as of December 2015 (Esther Duflo). Criteria two and
three account for famous economists who are less prolific—e.g., Paul Krugman—operate in fields with
slower production functions—e.g., industrial organisation—or publish extensively in other disciplines—
e.g., Daniel Kahneman. General results and conclusions do not change by making marginal adjustments
to any criteria—including redefining condition (1) to include every male and female author with at least
10–15 publications.
1.2 percent of authors satisfy at least one condition. On average, each has published 21 times in a top-five
journal; his highest cited paper is cited 1,844 times. Almost a third either won the Nobel Prize, the John
Bates Clark medal or both. All are male. See Table F.1 for a list of their names.
F.1.1 Results
Tables F.2–F.4 illustrate the effect of superstardom on gender differences in raw citation counts using
articles as the unit of analysis. Table F.2 is estimated using all observations. Column (1) controls only
for journal-year fixed effects and the female composition of a paper. It suggests that male-authored
papers are cited, on average, 15 more times than female-authored papers. The sign on the coefficient
flips, however, after including the superstar dummy (column (2)). Column (3) adds fixed effects for each
superstar author; results are similar to those in column (2). Columns (4)–(9) control for N , max. t and
max. T . The coefficient on female generally hovers around zero, but jumps to 10 in the final column.
Older male-authored papers likely drive the bulk of superstar bias. Their impact, however, should
attenuate the closer an article is to its date of publication. Tables F.3 and F.4 support this hypothesis.
They reproduce results from Table F.2, but restrict the sample to papers published after 1990 and 2000,
respectively. The coefficients on female in Table F.3 are universally larger than corresponding figures
from Table F.2; the estimate in the final column suggests female-authored papers are cited 16 more times
than male-authored papers. When data are restricted to articles published after 2000, female-authored
papers are consistently cited more frequently than male-authored papers. Moreover, superstardom has
little or no impact on the observed relationship between the female composition of a paper and its
citations (Table F.4).
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Table F.1: List of superstar men
Abel, Andrew B. Fisher, Franklin M. Pakes, Ariel
Acemoglu, Daron Fudenberg, Drew Palfrey, Thomas R.
Aghion, Philippe Gale, Douglas Persson, Torsten
Alesina, Alberto Granger, Clive W. J. Phillips, Peter C. B.
Andrews, Donald W. K. Green, Jerry R. Plott, Charles R.
Arellano, Manuel Grossman, Gene M. Postlewaite, Andrew
Banerjee, Abhijit V. Grossman, Sanford J. Ray, Debraj
Barro, Robert J. Gruber, Jonathan Robinson, Peter M.
Becker, Gary S. Gul, Faruk Romer, David H.
Bénabou, Roland Hamilton, James D. Rosen, Sherwin
Bernheim, B. Douglas Hansen, Lars Peter Rosenzweig, Mark R.
Besley, Timothy J. Hart, Oliver D. Roth, Alvin E.
Blackorby, Charles Hausman, Jerry A. Rubinstein, Ariel
Blanchard, Olivier J. Heckman, James J. Saez, Emmanuel
Blundell, Richard W. Helpman, Elhanan Samuelson, Larry
Bolton, Patrick Jackson, Matthew O. Sargent, Thomas J.
Browning, Martin J. Jovanovic, Boyan Scheinkman, José A.
Caballero, Ricardo J. Kahneman, Daniel Shleifer, Andrei
Campbell, John Y. Kehoe, Patrick J. Stein, Jeremy C.
Caplin, Andrew S. Kremer, Michael Stiglitz, Joseph E.
Card, David E. Krugman, Paul R. Tirole, Jean
Chiappori, Pierre-André Laffont, Jean-Jacques Tversky, Amos
Cooper, Russell Laroque, Guy Vishny, Robert W.
Crawford, Vincent P. Levine, David K. Weil, David N.
Deaton, Angus S. Levitt, Steven D. Weitzman, Martin L.
Diamond, Peter A. List, John A. White, Halbert
Dixit, Avinash K. Mankiw, N. Gregory Wolpin, Kenneth I.
Engle, Robert F. Maskin, Eric S. Wright, Randall
Epstein, Larry G. Milgrom, Paul R. Zame, William R.
Fehr, Ernst Murphy, Kevin M.


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































F.2 Nobel Prize-winning authors
In this Appendix, we swap our ad hoc definition of “superstar” (Appendix F.1) with fixed effects (and a
binary variable) for papers by Nobel Prize winning authors.2
About 0.9 percent of authors in our data are Nobel Prize winners. (See Table F.5 for a list of their
names.) On average, each has published five papers in a top-five journal; their highest cited paper was
cited 690 times.
F.2.1 Results
Results in Tables F.6, F.7 and F.8 closely mirror corresponding results from Appendix F.1. Controlling
for Nobel Prize winners reduces the magnitude of the coefficient on female authorship (Table F.6) but
the change is less pronounced when the sample is restricted to later years (Tables F.7 and F.8). Among
articles published after 2000 (Table F.8), female-authored papers are cited 11–17 times more frequently
and accounting for Nobel Prize winners does not observably impact this gap.
Table F.5: List of Nobel Prize winners
Akerlof, George A. Koopmans, Tjalling C. Samuelson, Paul A.
Allais, Maurice Krugman, Paul R. Sargent, Thomas J.
Arrow, Kenneth J. Kydland, Finn E. Scholes, Myron S.
Aumann, Robert J. Lucas, Robert E. (Jr.) Schultz, Theodore W.
Becker, Gary S. Markowitz, Harry M. Selten, Reinhard
Buchanan, James M. Maskin, Eric S. Sen, Amartya K.
Deaton, Angus S. McFadden, Daniel L. Shapley, Lloyd S.
Debreu, Gerard Merton, Robert C. Shiller, Robert J.
Diamond, Peter A. Miller, Merton H. Simon, Herbert A.
Engle, Robert F. Mirrlees, James A. Sims, Christopher A.
Fama, Eugene F. Modigliani, Franco Smith, Vernon L.
Friedman, Milton Mortensen, Dale T. Solow, Robert M.
Frisch, Ragnar Mundell, Robert A. Spence, A. Michael
Granger, Clive W. J. Myerson, Roger B. Stigler, George J.
Hansen, Lars Peter Nordhaus, William D. Stiglitz, Joseph E.
Harsanyi, John C. North, Douglass C. Stone, Richard
Hart, Oliver D. Ostrom, Elinor Thaler, Richard H.
Heckman, James J. Phelps, Edmund S. Tinbergen, Jan
Holmström, Bengt Pissarides, Christopher A. Tirole, Jean
Hurwicz, Leonid Prescott, Edward C. Tobin, James
Kahneman, Daniel Romer, Paul M. Williamson, Oliver E.
Klein, Lawrence R. Roth, Alvin E.
2We count only authors who had won the Nobel Prize when the data were last updated (October 2018; see Section 2);
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